Dangerous Speech and Dangerous Ideology: An Integrated Model for Monitoring and Prevention by Leader Maynard, Jonathan & Benesch, Susan
Genocide Studies and Prevention: An
International Journal
Volume 9 | 2016 Issue 3 | Article 8
Dangerous Speech and Dangerous Ideology: An
Integrated Model for Monitoring and Prevention
Jonathan Leader Maynard
University of Oxford
Susan Benesch
American University; Harvard University
Abstract.
There is considerable agreement amongst scholars and international actors that ideologies and
speech play a critical role in the path of escalation towards mass atrocity crimes. Speech features
prominently in the jurisprudence of the U.N. war crimes tribunal for Rwanda, for example, and in
historical accounts of the months and years preceding many other genocides. Nonetheless, this is
one of the most underdeveloped components of genocide and atrocity prevention, in both theory
and practice. This paper draws together the authors’ independent past work on dangerous speech and
the ideological dynamics of mass atrocities by offering a new integrated model to help identify the
sorts of speech and ideology that raise the risk of atrocities and genocides. We suggest that this
model should inform monitoring activities concerned with the risk of genocides and mass atrocities,
and prevention efforts at the strategic and targeted levels.
Keywords.
dangerous speech, ideology, atrocities, genocide, prevention, justification, discourse
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Genocide Studies and
Prevention: An International Journal by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Recommended Citation
Leader Maynard, Jonathan and Benesch, Susan (2016) "Dangerous Speech and Dangerous Ideology: An Integrated Model for
Monitoring and Prevention," Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal: Vol. 9: Iss. 3: 70-95.
DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.9.3.1317
Available at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/gsp/vol9/iss3/8
Jonathan Leader Maynard and Susan Benesch, “Dangerous Speech and Dangerous Ideology: An Integrated Model for Monitoring 
and Prevention” Genocide Studies and Prevention 9, 3 (2016): 70–95. ©2016 Genocide Studies and Prevention.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.9.3.1317
Dangerous Speech and Dangerous Ideology: An Integrated Model for 
Monitoring and Prevention
Jonathan Leader Maynard
The University of Oxford
Oxford, United Kingdom
Susan Benesch 
American University
Washington, D.C., USA
Abstract: There is considerable agreement amongst scholars and international actors that ideologies and 
speech play a critical role in the path of escalation towards mass atrocity crimes. Speech features prominently 
in the jurisprudence of the U.N. war crimes tribunal for Rwanda, for example, and in historical accounts of 
the months and years preceding many other genocides. Nonetheless, this is one of the most underdeveloped 
components of genocide and atrocity prevention, in both theory and practice. This paper draws together 
the authors’ independent past work on dangerous speech and the ideological dynamics of mass atrocities 
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Introduction
On 12 March 1941, the German Reichskommissar of the occupied Netherlands, Arthur Seyss-
Inquart, addressed collected German officials in Amsterdam, using archetypal pre-genocidal 
language. Reaffirming a chronic claim of Nazi ideology—that Jews sought to annihilate the 
Germans—he stated:
The Jews are the enemy of national socialism and the national socialistic Reich. From the 
moment of their emancipation, their methods were directed to the annihilation of the 
common and moral worth of the German people... They are the enemies with whom we can 
neither come to an armistice nor to peace...”1
Seyss-Inquart’s language has since been echoed by a great many propagandists in a striking 
diversity of countries and cultures, to cultivate fear and hatred, and incite mass violence against 
civilians. This is a particular sort of speech that scholars and policymakers have begun to focus on 
for its apparent role in promoting mass atrocities. As paragraph 21 of the United Nations Secretary-
General’s 2013 report on State Responsibility and Prevention affirms:
[T]he underlying motivation for targeting a community...is an additional risk factor for atrocity 
crimes. This motivation is often demonstrated through the use of exclusionary ideology and 
the construction of identities in terms of “us” and “them” to accentuate differences. These 
differences can be even further accentuated through hate speech or propaganda campaigns 
that depict the targeted community as disloyal, as a security or economic threat or as inferior 
in order to justify action against the community.2
Such discourse is indeed typical. But advocates of mass violence also use a variety of other, quite 
different rhetorics in calling for the killing of civilians. Their justifications do not always rely 
on hatred or blatant exclusionary discourse. Twenty three years before Seyss-Inquart’s words, 
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin published one of the most detailed justifications of the fledgling Soviet 
1 Office of the United Sates Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality, U.S. G.P.O., Nazi Conspiracy and 
Aggression, vol. VI (Washington D.C, 1946), Document 3430-PS, 136.
2 United Nations General Assembly. 2013. Responsibility to protect: State responsibility and prevention. New York, 5.
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regime’s ongoing ‘Red Terror’ in the Russian Civil War. In a letter in the 22 Aug 1918 issue of 
Pravda, the official newspaper of the Bolshevik party, Lenin denounced critics of Soviet violence, 
arguing:
To blame us for the “destruction” of industry, or for the “terror”, is either hypocrisy or 
dull-witted pedantry; it reveals an inability to understand the basic conditions of the fierce 
class struggle…. for in revolutionary epochs the class struggle has always, inevitably, and 
in every country, assumed the form of civil war, and civil war is inconceivable without the 
severest destruction, terror and the restriction of formal democracy in the interests of this 
war. Only unctuous parsons… cannot see, understand and feel this necessity. Only a lifeless 
“man in the muffler” can shun the revolution for this reason instead of plunging into battle 
with the utmost ardour and determination at a time when history demands that the greatest 
problems of humanity be solved by struggle and war.3
Lenin does not justify terror here via hatred of those it targeted, but in light of a theoretically dense 
claim that revolutionary violence is necessary. This constituted a powerful and highly violent 
worldview which endorsed and rationalized atrocities by the new Soviet government against its 
own civilians. And Lenin’s arguments here are not idiosyncratic outliers. Assertions that violence 
is inevitable and unavoidable, and the displacing of responsibility for it onto others (or simply onto 
abstract historical forces), are recurring features of the ideologies behind many different atrocities. 
Most such claims are quite different from the hate speech or dehumanization that tend to 
dominate current discussions of the role of speech, ideology and propaganda in catalyzing 
mass violence. So while it is often important, hate can be something of a distraction.4 Research 
on perpetrators by Christopher Browning, Lee Ann Fujii, John Mueller, Scott Straus and others 
suggests that hatred of another group often isn’t what drives a person to kill.5 Some scholars 
erroneously conclude from this that ideology or speech in general are not catalysts for violence 
—assuming that ideology and speech can encourage violence only by inculcating hatred. This 
is a mistake. Instead, a broad repertoire of justifications for atrocity can help explain why many 
perpetrators commit violence even though they do not match classic stereotypes of the wild-eyed 
fanatic, enthusiastically slaughtering civilians. Both speech and the ideology that underpins it can be 
dangerous (in the sense of promoting violence) without being hateful, and can also be hateful without being 
dangerous. Less ardent beliefs matter: cool but anxious perceptions that other groups have radical 
or threatening ambitions, for instance, or a sense that terror is the only option for resolving a 
particular social problem, or a belief that violence is honourable and necessary.
Critically, such justifications are patterned across cases. The forms of speech and ideology that 
catalyze mass violence, and the ways in which they do so, are strikingly similar across different cases. The 
same sorts of justification recur with uncanny similarity across cases from widely differing time 
periods, across vast geographical distances, and in spite of contrasting social, political and cultural 
contexts.6 This should not obscure differences—sensitivity to the context-specific ideological and 
3 Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich. 1969. “Letter to American Workers.” In Lenin: Selected Works. Edited by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. 
London: Lawrence & Wishart, 461-462.
4 Ross, Andrew A.G. 2014. Mixed Emotions: Beyond Fear and Hatred in International Conflict. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press; Fujii, Lee Ann. 2008. “The Power of Local Ties: Popular Participation in the Rwandan Genocide.” Security Studies 
Vol. 17, No. 3, 570-571.
5 Fujii, Lee Ann. 2009. Killing Neighbours: Webs of Violence in Rwanda. New York: Cornell University Press; Browning, 
Christopher R. 2001. Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland. London: Penguin Books; 
Mueller, John. 2000. “The Banality of ‘Ethnic War’.” International Security Vol. 25, No. 1, 42-70; Straus, Scott. 2006. The 
Order of Genocide: Race, Power and War in Rwanda. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
6 Bellamy, Alex J. 2012a. “Mass Killing and the Politics of Legitimacy: Empire and the Ideology of Selective 
Extermination.” Australian Journal of Politics and History Vol. 58, No. 2, 18; Bellamy, Alex J. 2012b. Massacres and Morality: 
Mass Atrocities in an Age of Civilian Immunity. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Sémelin, Jacques 2005. Purify and Destroy: 
The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide. London: Hurst & Company; Kiernan, Ben. 2003. “Twentieth-Century Genocides: 
Underlying Ideological Themes from Armenia to East Timor.” In The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical 
Perspective. Edited by Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Weitz, Eric D. 2003. A 
Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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discursive dynamics of particular atrocities is crucial, and the recurring patterns do not tell the 
whole story. But the fact that there are such patterns is not only important but useful, holding open 
the possibility that discerning them can support efforts to prevent mass atrocities. 
This breadth in the way atrocities are justified, patterns in such justification, and the 
implications this creates for monitoring and prevention activities, have not been adequately 
addressed in the literature.7 Speech and ideology feature prominently in the jurisprudence of the 
U.N. war crimes tribunal for Rwanda, the risk analysis framework of the Office of the Special 
Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide, the report of the Genocide Prevention Task Force and a 
wide range of academic research.8 Yet references to “hate”, “dehumanization” and related forms 
of blatantly vicious discourse still dominate such documents.9 Whilst scholars have generated 
considerable insights regarding the ideological and discursive dynamics of genocides and mass 
atrocities, especially in deep, case-specific research,10 analysis of the role played by speech and 
ideology remains one of the more underdeveloped components of the comparative theorising 
of genocides and mass atrocities, and the lacuna is largest with respect to monitoring 
and prevention.
In this paper, we begin to fill these gaps, in order to enhance both the theory and practice 
of mass atrocity risk monitoring and prevention. We do this in three steps. First, we provide a 
brief theoretical overview of the relationship between speech and ideology, and explain how these 
two phenomena relate to violence. Second, we combine two existing frameworks that we have 
independently formulated elsewhere—Benesch’s ‘Dangerous Speech’ framework11 and Leader 
Maynard’s ‘Six Justificatory Mechanisms’ framework.12 Together, these provide an integrated 
model for identifying the contextual and content-based risk factors associated with certain sorts of 
speech and ideology. They can thus provide a more comprehensive basis for monitoring activities 
that might support efforts to assess the risk of mass violence. Finally, we consider how this 
integrated model can inform attempts to counter dangerous speech and ideology, and help to 
prevent genocide and mass atrocities.
7 For exceptions, see: Leader Maynard, Jonathan. 2014. “Rethinking the Role of Ideology in Mass Atrocities.” Terrorism 
and Political Violence Vol. 26, No. 5, 821-841; Bellamy, Massacres and Morality; Slim, Hugo. 2007. Killing Civilians: Method, 
Madness and Morality in War. London: Hurst & Company; Sémelin, Purify and Destroy; Kiernan, “Twentieth-Century 
Genocides.”
8 Genocide Prevention Task Force. 2008. Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers.Washington, DC: United 
States Institute of Peace; United Nations. 2014. United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to 
Protect, Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes. New York; Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. 2012. A 
Common Standard for Applying R2P, APC R2P Ideas in Brief, Vol. 2/3; Straus, Scott. 2015. Making and Unmaking Nations: War, 
Leadership and Genocide in Modern Africa. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Sanín, Francisco Gutiérrez and Elisabeth Jean 
Wood. 2014. “Ideology in Civil War: Instrumental Adoption and Beyond.” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 51, No. 2, 213-226; 
Cohrs, J. Christopher. 2012. “Ideological Bases of Violent Conflict.” In Oxford Handbook of Intergroup Conflict. Edited by 
Linda R. Tropp. New York: Oxford University Press.
9 For leading research on dehumanization, see: Smith, David Livingstone. 2011. Less Than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave 
and Exterminate Others. New York: St. Martin’s Press; Haslam, Nick. 2006. “Dehumanization: An Integrative Review.” 
Personality and Social Psychology Review Vol. 10, No. 3, 252-264.
10 Ryan, James. 2012. Lenin’s Terror: The Ideological Origins of Early Soviet State Violence. Abingdon: Routledge; Goldman, 
Wendy Z. 2011. Inventing the Enemy: Denunciation and Terror in Stalin’s Russia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 
Priestland, David. 2007. Stalinism and the Politics of Mobilization: Ideas, Power, and Terror in Inter-war Russia. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press; Fujii, Lee Ann. 2004. “Transforming the Moral Landscape: The Diffusion of a Genocidal Norm in 
Rwanda.” Journal of Genocide Research Vol. 6, No. 1, 99-114; Koonz, Claudia. 2003. The Nazi Conscience. Cambridge, MA: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press; Hinton, Alexander Laban. 1998. “Why Did You Kill?: The Cambodian 
Genocide and the Dark Side of Face and Honour.” The Journal of Asian Studies Vol. 57, No. 1, 93-122; Jackson, Karl D. 1989. 
“The Ideology of Total Revolution.” In Cambodia 1975-1978: Rendezvous with Death. Edited by Karl D. Jackson. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press; Mosse, George L. 1981. The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich. New 
York: Schocken Books; Fein, Helen. 1979. Accounting for Genocide: National Responses and Jewish Victimization During the 
Holocaust. New York: Free Press.
11 Benesch, Susan, “Dangerous Speech: A Proposal to Prevent Group Violence.” Available from: http://www.worldpolicy.
org/susan-benesch (accessed 15 Oct 2012). 
12 Leader Maynard, Jonathan. 2015a. “Combating Atrocity-Justifying Ideologies.” In The Responsibility to Prevent: 
Overcoming the Challenges to Atrocity Prevention. Edited by Serena K. Sharma and Jennifer Welsh. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press; Leader Maynard, “Rethinking the Role of Ideology.”
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Analysing Speech and Ideology in Mass Violence
The relationship between speech and ideology (or, more generally, thought) has long been a 
subject of theoretical reflection in linguistics, philosophy, intellectual history, political theory and 
social theory.13 Yet it generally lacks theoretical clarification in contemporary scholarship on mass 
violence.14 This is unfortunate, since speech and ideology are vitally interrelated. 
Following recent trends in the study of ideology in the social sciences, we conceptualize 
ideology broadly,15 defining it as a distinctive system of normative and/or purportedly factual 
ideas, typically shared by members of groups or societies, which underpins individuals’ 
understanding of their political world and guides their political behaviour.16 As systems of ideas, 
ideologies are stored in memory, providing cognitive resources for thinking processes, including 
decision-making processes and, thereby, shaping agents’ behaviour.17 Each person’s ideology is 
unique (their ‘personal ideology’), but social scientists also analyze ‘group ideologies’: analytical 
constructs describing important similarities across the personal but heterogeneous ideologies of 
group members. Ideologies can also acquire important social dimensions as they are embedded 
in institutions and recognized in political discourse. By speech or ‘speech act,’ we mean any act 
of human communication, not only in the form of verbal discourse but also including non-verbal 
communication such as images, gestures, music, rituals, and so forth.
Ideologies are communicated by speech and, consequently, constructed and altered through 
speech.18 They are also produced through an individual’s own thinking, but genuinely creative 
thinking is arduous.19 Most people avoid it most of the time, instead picking up and reusing 
prominent and familiar ideas from social discourse. The bulk of ideological development in a 
group or society therefore tends to be driven by the thinking of a relative minority, though these 
may not necessarily conform to the presumed ‘intellectual elite’, and various forms of bottom up 
13 Geertz, Clifford. 1964. “Ideology as a Cultural System.” In Ideology and Discontent. Edited by David Apter. London: Free 
Press of Glencoe; Berger, Peter L. and Thomas Luckmann. 1967. The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology 
of Knowledge. New York: Anchor Books; Searle, John R. 1969. Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press; Whorf, Benjamin Lee. 1971. Language, Thought, and Reality. Cambridge, MA: The M.I.T. 
Press; Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. London: Lawrence & Wishart; Althusser, Louis. 1971. 
“Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation).” In Louis Althusser. Lenin and Philosophy 
and Other Essays. New York: Monthly Review Press, 85-126; Skinner, Quentin. 1974. “Some Problems in the Analysis of 
Political Thought and Action.” Symposium on Quentin Skinner, Political Theory Vol. 2, No. 3, 277-303; Edelman, Murray. 
1977. Political Language: Words That Succeed and Policies That Fail.New York: Academic Press; Foucault, Michel. 1982. “The 
Subject and Power,” Critical Inquiry Vol. 8, No. 4, 777-795; Kay, Paul and Willett Kempton. 1984. “What Is the Sapir-Whorf 
Hypothesis?” American Anthropologist Vol. 86, No. 1, 65-79; Lakoff, George. Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things. Chicago: 
Chicago University Press; Searle, John R. 1995. The Construction of Social Reality. London: Penguin; Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 
2001. Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte, 4th ed. Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishing Ltd; Finlayson, Alan. 2013. “Ideology and Political Rhetoric.” In The Oxford Handbook of Political 
Ideologies. Edited by Michael Freeden, Lyman Tower Sargent, and Marc Stears. Oxford: Oxford University Press; van Dijk, 
Teun A. 2013. “Ideology and Discourse.” In The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies. Edited by Michael Freeden, Lyman 
Tower Sargent, and Marc Stears. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
14 There are exceptions, and this section draws on existing scholarship on genocide, violence, speech and ideology from a 
range of fields. For examples of sophisticated work on the role of speech and/or ideology in violence, see footnotes 8 and 9. 
15 van Dijk, Teun, 1998. Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach. London: Sage Books, 3; Knight, Kathleen. 2006. 
“Transformations in the Concept of Ideology in the Twentieth Century.” American Political Science Review Vol. 100, No. 4, 
1-8; Humphrey, Matthew. 2005. “(De)contesting ideology: The Struggle Over the Meaning of the Struggle over Meaning.” 
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy Vol. 8, No. 2, 422. See also: Geertz. 1984. “Ideology as a Cultural 
System.” Earlier work does not always embrace such a broad conception of ideology, and for defenses of narrower 
pejorative conceptions, see: Thompson, John. 1984. Studies in the Theory of Ideology. Cambridge: Polity Press; Larrain, Jorge. 
1979. The Concept of Ideology. London: Hutchinson & Co.
16 Leader Maynard, “Rethinking the Role of Ideology,” 823-825.
17 van Dijk, Teun. 2013. Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach; Homer-Dixon, Thomas, Jonathan Leader Maynard, Matto 
Mildenberger, Manjana Milkoreit, Steven J. Mock, Stephen Quilley, Tobias Schröder, and Paul Thagard. 2013. “A Complex 
Systems Approach to the Study of Ideology: Cognitive-Affective Structures and the Dynamics of Belief Systems.” Journal 
of Social and Political Psychology Vol. 1, No. 1, 175-196.
18 van Dijk, Teun. 2010. Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach; Fairclough, Norman. 2010. Critical Discourse Analysis: The 
Critical Study of Language. Harlow: Pearson, Ch.2; Althusser, “Ideological State Apparatuses.”
19 Slovic, Paul, David Zionts, Andrew K. Woods, Ryan Goodman, and Derek Jinks. 2012. “Psychic Numbing and Mass 
Atrocity.” In The Behavioural Foundations of Public Policy. Edited by Eldar Shafir. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1333.
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activism are often ideologically powerful.20 Just as speech communicates and alters ideology, so 
ideology essentially underpins speech. Speech acts often express ideological claims, and draw on 
the speakers’ underlying ideologies. And the impact the speech acts have on others is necessarily 
mediated by the existing ideologies of those individuals—since their ideologies provide the 
existing assumptions, beliefs and interpretative frameworks used to understand, reflect on and 
evaluate such speech.
Ideological claims might represent instrumental moves that serve a variety of interests. They 
might, for example, be ways for community or political leaders to legitimate themselves in the 
minds of domestic constituencies and audiences, or they might be used to solicit financial or 
symbolic support from external actors, like great power patrons or affiliated diasporas.21 Ideological 
claims can be used in this way, regardless of whether those espousing them truly believe them. 
But ideological speech might also genuinely represent actors’ personal ideologies—here ideology 
plays a constitutive role in providing actors’ actual beliefs and understandings.22 These could be 
evaluative beliefs about the permissibility or impermissibility of attacking certain sorts of targets, 
or of the moral praiseworthiness or reprehensibility of violence in general. Or they could be 
descriptive beliefs, about the threat posed by a certain group, or the likelihood that a shocking 
atrocity will deter future aggression against the in-group, which make violence appear necessary 
or desirable.23
Consequently, speech can matter since it offers evidence of the ideologies of actors producing 
it, or because it is likely to create certain effects in audiences. Scholars cannot properly assess 
a risk of violence by examining speech without considering ideology, or ideology without 
considering speech. One cannot acquire any deep understanding of actors’ ideological positions 
without examining their actual discourse (broadly conceived). Familiar big ideological labels like 
‘communist’, ‘Islamist’, or ‘nationalist’, so often used to code the ideological positions of key actors 
for social scientific analysis, encompass far too many distinct strains of belief-system to reliably 
predict or analyze behaviour. Describing actors’ ideologies more specifically and accurately is 
possible, but only by consulting what they actually say. Conversely, successfully interpreting what 
actors meant by certain speech, discerning how that speech connects to other speech acts, evaluating 
the likelihood that it is sincere, and assessing its likely impact on audience behaviour, requires 
consideration of the probable ideology of the speaker and the ideological content expressed in 
the speech.24 And predicting what impact the speech is likely to have on an audience is therefore 
impossible without some knowledge of the ideological environment, including recent history of 
the context in question, and the probable ideological commitments of the audience(s).
Ideas can be held by perpetrators with varying levels of consciousness and conviction. They 
might be explicit and fanatical beliefs that drive fervent participation in violence. Yet this is 
typically not the case. Much of the time, key ideas might be believed ambivalently, regretfully, 
presumptively, unthinkingly, or for lack of apparent alternatives. These weaker, more nuanced 
levels of endorsement can still be sufficient for the ideas to generate participation in violence in a 
variety of roles.25 Frequently, the key burden for success for a particular ideology in turning a group 
toward violence is not how many people entirely internalize the ideology and become devotees 
or even perpetrators, but how many partially internalize the ideology enough to see violence as 
permissible or even desirable. Although perpetrators constitute only a small proportion of the total 
population of an in-group, even in cases of mass violence with high levels of civilian participation, 
they rely on the support and approval of other members of their social groups.
20 Tarrow, Sidney. 2013. The Language of Contention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
21 Sanín and Wood, “Ideology in civil war,” 217-220.
22 Ibid, 220-222.
23 Though evaluation and description are intertwined.
24 See also: Tully, James H. 1983. “The Pen is a Mighty Sword: Quentin Skinner’s Analysis of Politics.” British Journal of 
Political Science Vol. 13, No. 4, 489-509; Skinner, Quentin. 2002. Visions of Politics Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press; Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis, 57.
25 Leader Maynard, “Rethinking the Role of Ideology,” 825-826; Leader Maynard, Jonathan. 2015b. “Preventing Mass 
Atrocities: Ideological Strategies and Interventions.” Politics and Governance Vol. 3, No. 3, 68-71.
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Ideas also influence behaviour in different ways. Whether deeply or shallowly felt, they can 
provide key motives for violence, or they can provide key legitimations for it, shaping perceptions 
of its permissibility even if they do not provide the primary reasons for wanting to engage in it. Or 
they may do both. They might sincerely drive the original decisions to engage in violence, or function 
as a post-hoc rationalization for acts conducted for other reasons (though such rationalizations 
might still be crucial for maintaining willingness to participate in lengthy, reiterative campaigns 
of violence). And ideas can also, of course, restrain violence.26 The balance between the availability 
and power of ideological justifications and restraints in a particular context determines the overall 
ideological impetus towards violence—and this is crucial for thinking about how to counter such 
justifications, as we do in Part 3.
We do not suggest that dangerous speech and ideology are the only catalysts for mass violence, 
nor that they deterministically produce it. Human beings have autonomy to choose among actions, 
and their decisions are affected by myriad external factors, including a large variety of speech to 
which they are exposed over time.27 Therefore it is rare to find definitive evidence that a person 
engaged in violence because of a particular act of speech, though exceptions include orders to 
kill or be killed, orders given by commanders to their troops, and certain inflammatory false 
rumours.28 We can make educated and systematic estimations of the effects of speech given the 
best possible data on its context, content, and the likely ideological dispositions of speakers and 
audience, but our analytical tools often cannot reliably measure the impact of individual acts of 
speech on individual people, and we do not pretend to be able to predict them accurately. Indeed 
Benesch has criticized some of the judges of the international war crimes tribunal for Rwanda for 
asserting that speech ‘caused’ mass killings.29
Scholars have begun to search for evidence of links between speech and intergroup violence at 
scale. One study on the well-known case of the Rwandan radio station Radio Télévision Libre des 
Milles Collines (RTLM) used econometrics and transmission patterns to suggest that killing was 
more intense in Rwandan villages that received RTLM broadcasts, than in others that did not.30 A 
similar study on the effects of an intervention by ActionAid International Nigeria found that 
anti-violence campaigning, conversely, substantially reduced levels of subsequent political 
violence surrounding the 2007 national and state-level elections in Nigeria.31 Still, the complex, 
multifarious links between speech, ideology and violence require greater, broader and deeper 
investigation.32
As is widely recognized in the literature, genocides and mass atrocities do not occur 
spontaneously, but represent the culmination of lengthy and often non-linear radicalizing 
trajectories.33 Mass violence may recur with tragic frequency in human history,34 but it is 
26 Straus, Scott. 2012a. “Retreating from the Brink: Theorizing Mass Violence and the Dynamics of Restraint.” Perspectives 
on Politics Vol. 10, No. 2, 343-363; Thaler, Kai M. 2012. “Ideology and Violence in Civil Wars: Theory and Evidence 
from Mozambique and Angola.” Civil Wars Vol. 14, No. 4, 546-467; Goodwin, Jeff. 2007. “”The Struggle Made Me a 
Nonracialist”: Why There Was So Little Terrorism in the Anti-Apartheid Struggle.” Mobilization: An International Quarterly 
Review Vol. 12, No. 2, 193-203.
27 See also: Yee, Albert S. 1996. “The causal effects of ideas on policies.” International Organization Vol. 50, No. 1, 96-103.
28 Osborn, Michelle. 2008. “Fuelling the Flames: Rumour and Politics in Kibera.” Journal of Eastern African Studies Vol. 2, 
No. 2, 315-327.
29 Benesch, Susan, 2011. “The Ghost of Causation in International Speech Crime Cases.” In Propaganda, War Crimes Trials & 
International Law: From Speakers’ Corner to War Crimes. Edited by Predrag Dojčinović. Abingdon: Routledge.
30 Yanagizawa-Drott, David. 2014 “Propaganda and Conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan Genocide.” The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics Vol. 129, No. 4, 1947-1994. These findings are disputed, however, see: Straus, Scott. 2007. “What Is the 
Relationship between Hate Radio and Violence? Rethinking Rwanda’s ‘Radio Machete’.” Politics and Society, Vol. 35, No 4, 
609-637
31 Collier, Paul and Pedro C. Vicente. 2013. “Votes and Violence: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigeria.” The 
Economic Journal Vol. 124, No 574, 5327-5355.
32 For a summary of further existing research, see: Leader Maynard, “Preventing Mass Atrocities,” 68-71 & 74-5.
33 Staub, Ervin. 1989. The Roots of Evil.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
34 Gerlach, Christian. 2010. Extremely Violent Societies: Mass Violence in the Twentieth-Century World. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 3.
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nevertheless unusual, not a normal condition of human existence.35 Some degree of radicalization 
from the norm is thus necessary. Many parts of such radicalizing journeys are not principally 
ideological: existing policies are replaced by successively more extreme and provocative options, 
low level violence psychologically habituates perpetrators for more extensive campaigns, complex 
bureaucratic arrangements develop progressively and expand a group’s capacity to organize 
violence on a mass scale, and so forth.36
But changes in speech, and the changes in ideologies they reflect and cause, are part of the 
radicalizing trajectory. In the months or years preceding mass intergroup violence, relevant 
groups of perpetrators and their supporters come increasingly to see violence as permissible and 
even necessary. Repertoires of ideas and arguments that encourage such a perception become 
increasingly formulated and disseminated through speech—spoken, written or otherwise—
allowing greater numbers of potential perpetrators to see violence as increasingly thinkable, 
possible, and justified, and to possess the justificatory resources necessary to convince others. Such 
trajectories are complex, may be halting and uneven, and involve a mix of ‘top-down’, ‘bottom-up’ 
and ‘horizontal’ processes.37 Although explicit and easily identifiable propaganda campaigns can 
be powerful, they are not the only form that matters. Much dissemination and radicalization occurs 
through diffuse and gradual processes of political, cultural and intellectual change.38
The mix of dissemination and radicalization processes is visible in a number of classic cases of 
mass violence. In the Soviet Union, for example, security policies towards perceived internal threats 
progressively radicalized from the early 1930s onwards, leading to the mass Stalinist violence of 
the 1937-8 period. Much of this was fairly centralized and elite-level. The party leadership around 
Stalin articulated securitized diagnoses of economic failings and alarmist interpretations of 
domestic conditions, producing a series of reports that were discussed amongst the Bolshevik Party 
Central Committee, and then propagated downwards throughout the extensive party apparatus 
(though there was also positive feedback up the system, and varying forms of mass participation).39 
In post-World War I Germany, by contrast, key ideas that would provide the foundations for Nazi 
atrocities initially circulated in a range of veterans networks and paramilitary organizations, that 
pulled in many young Germans, popularized contempt for Jews and the Weimar Republic, and 
glorified violence.40 After the Nazi seizure of power the principal dynamics of dissemination shifted 
to the extreme, propagandistic indoctrination of large sections of German society through private 
and state media, the Nazi Party, a range of affiliated Nazi organizations, and the military.41 In 
Rwanda, Hutu extremism developed amongst key elites many decades prior to the 1994 genocide. 
Their radical ideas were increasingly disseminated through the education system, quasi-official 
publications, and radio.42 In the months before the genocide itself, radio networks like Radio 
Rwanda and RTLM disseminated radicalizing Hutu Power notions, and social and political leaders 
disseminated such ideas in speeches that were further propagated among friends, neighbors, and 
35 Mann, Michael. 2005. The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 9-10; 
Midlarsky, Manus. 2005. The Killing Trap: Genocide in the Twentieth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 16; Straus, 
“Retreating from the Brink,” 343.
36 Fujii, “Transforming the Moral Landscape,” 107-108.
37 Gerlach, Extremely Violent Societies, 88.
38 Davis Biddle, Tami. 2002. Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic 
Bombing, 1914-1945. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Pulzer, Peter. 1988. The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany 
and Austria. London: Peter Halban; Hunt, Michael H. 1987. Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy. New Haven: Yale University 
Press; Mosse, Crisis of German Ideology.
39 Arch Getty, John and Oleg V. Naumov. 1999. The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the Bolsheviks, 1932-1939. 
New Haven: Yale University Press; Goldman, Inventing the Enemy.
40 Bartov, Omer. 2003. “”Fields of Glory”: War, Genocide, and the Glorification of Violence.” In Catastrophe and Meaning: 
The Holocaust and the Twentieth Century. Edited by Moishe Postone and Eric Santner. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 
Weiss, John. 1997. Ideology of Death: Why the Holocaust Happened in Germany.Chicago: Elephant Paperbacks, Ch. 15 & 16.
41 Overy, Richard J. 2004. The Dictators. London: Allen Lane, Ch. 3-4 & 7-9; Burleigh, Michael. 2001. The Third Reich: A New 
History. London: Pan Books, Ch. 3; Weiss, Ideology of Death, Ch. 19-22; Aronsfeld, Ceasar C. 1985. The Text of the Holocaust: 
A Study of the Nazis’ Extermination Propaganda, from 1919-1945, Marblehead, MA: Micah Publications.
42 Kaufman, Stuart J. 2006. “Symbolic Politics or Rational Choice: Testing Theories of Extreme Ethnic Violence.” 
International Security Vol. 30, No. 4, 71-74; Fujii, “Transforming the Moral Landscape,” 102-103.
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relatives by word of mouth. Through such dissemination and radicalization, as Stuart Kaufman 
summarizes, “the extremists were able to make their genocidal program accepted as part of the 
normal political landscape.”43 
Such processes of radicalization consistently include speech that justifies violence in 
characteristic ways, using recurring ideological and rhetorical patterns. To understand how this 
encourages violence, we need a model of the features of speech, and the ideologies behind it, that 
are dangerous.
Dangerous Speech and Dangerous Ideology: An Integrated Model
The force of a speech act, and specifically its capacity to encourage approval of violence in the minds 
of listeners, is the product of both the context and content of what is said (and these feed into and 
overlap with one another).44 Even the most inflammatory or powerful justification of violence may 
have little chance of leading to atrocities if uttered in a context where it cannot be disseminated, 
where the audience strongly disapproves of violence, or where the speaker has no influence or 
authority. Conversely, a highly authoritative speaker engaging with a volatile audience and using 
powerful mechanisms of dissemination will not raise the risk of atrocities unless the content of 
what s/he says portrays violence as permissible or desirable, producing ideological notions that 
allow an individual to see atrocities as justified.
Identifying when speech is in danger of causing violence must therefore be a two-part inquiry. 
In this section we propose an analytical framework that describes the features of both context and 
content that lead to speech which may increase the risk of atrocities.
Context
The context can be described systematically with reference to four of its features or aspects, any or 
all of which can confer greater force on the speech act, i.e. make it more influential: the speaker, the 
audience, the socio-historical environment, and the means of dissemination.
First, in many cases the speaker or source of the message may be a powerful contextual element. A 
speaker might have authority over the audience derived from political office or de facto leadership. 
In other cases (and in some of the same ones, since one person may have multiple bases of influence), 
a speaker derives authority from religious position or status, or from their status as a public 
performer, such as an actor or athlete.45 Or they may carry particular ‘epistemic’ authority in light 
of audiences’ dependence on them for information that is deemed credible.46 Even where there is 
no vocational basis for influence, a speaker may acquire influence with charisma,47 or a persuasive 
speaking style that skillfully deploys rhetoric48 and mobilizes an audience’s affective inclinations.49
43 Kaufman, “Symbolic Politics,” 75.
44 Tully, “The Pen is a Mighty Sword: Quentin Skinner’s Analysis of Politics”; Skinner, Visions of Politics Vol. 1.
45 The psychological dynamics of authority were famously studied in: Milgram, Stanley. 2010. Obedience to Authority: 
An Experimental View. London: Pinter & Martin Ltd. See also: Mastroianni, George R. 2015. “Obedience in perspective: 
Psychology and the Holocaust.” Theory & Psychology Vol. 25, No. 5. 657-669.; Blass, Thomas. 1999. “The Milgram Paradigm 
After 35 Years: Some Things We Now Know About Obedience to Authority.” Journal of Applied Social Psychology Vol. 29, 
No. 5, 955-978; Kelman, Herbert C. and V. Lee Hamilton. 1989. Crimes of Obedience. New Haven: Yale University Press.
46 Hardwig, John. 1985. “Epistemic Dependence.” Journal of Philosophy Vol. 82, No. 7, 335-349; Baurmann, Michael. 2007. 
“Rational Fundamentalism? An Explanatory Model of Fundamentalist Beliefs.” Episteme Vol. 4, No. 2, 150-166.
47 Hoffmann, David. 2015. “Quantifying and Qualifying Charisma: A Theoretical Framework for Measuring the Presence 
of Charismatic Authority in Terrorist Groups.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Vol. 38, No. 9, 710-733
48 On the importance of rhetoric, see: Finlayson, Alan. 2012. “Rhetoric and the Political Theory of Ideologies.” Political 
Studies Vol. 60, No. 4, 751-767; Frazer, Elizabeth and Kimberly Hutchings. 2007. “Argument and Rhetoric in the 
Justification of Political Violence.” European Journal of Political Theory Vol 6, No. 2, 180-199; Billig, Michael. 1991. Ideology 
and Opinions: Studies in Rhetorical Psychology. London: Sage Publications.
49 On recent analyses of the importance of affect and emotion in violence, see: Hall, Todd H. and Andrew A.G. Ross. 2015. 
“Affective Politics After 9/11.” International Organization Vol. 69, No. 4, 847-879; Olusanya, Olaoluwa. 2014. Emotions, 
Decision-Making and Mass Atrocities: Through the Lens of the Macro-MicroIntegrated Theoretical Model. Farnham: Ashgate; 
Steele, Brent J. 2013. “Revenge, Affect, and Just War.” In Just War: Authority, Tradition, and Practice. Edited by Anthony F. 
Lang, Cian O’Driscoll, and John Williams. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press; McDoom, Omar Shahabudin. 
2012. “The Psychology of Threat in Intergroup Conflict: Emotions, Rationality, and Opportunity in the Rwandan 
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The second contextual element is the audience itself. No audience is homogeneous, and 
individual members of the audience vary in their propensity to commit violence, for any number 
of reasons. Analysis can and should focus on audiences, or audience members, most likely to 
respond violently.50 In almost any human group or society, young men are more likely to attack 
other people than other demographic subgroups.51 In addition, people of any age and gender can 
become more likely to resort to violence – or to condone it when it is committed on their behalf – 
when they are afraid of being seriously harmed by another person or group, and especially when 
they believe themselves – or their dependents – to be subject to an existential threat. The extent 
to which an audience is susceptible to dangerous speech is thus, itself, partly a question of the 
existing audience ideology.
The third element consists of the social and historical context, which can increase the chance 
that inflammatory messages will be accepted by the audience even where they are exaggerated or 
entirely false, as in the example with which we began this article. Other scholars have described 
social and structural characteristics that increase the chances of intergroup violence; in fact there 
has been so much work on cataloguing and examining the relative weight of such factors (often for 
early warning efforts) that we do not attempt to repeat it all here.52 Some of the most relevant points 
are longstanding grievances between the relevant groups, a weak or dysfunctional justice system, 
competition among groups for scarce basic resources, and land disputes.53 And again, assessment of 
the social and historical context is in part a question of the extant ideological environment. Notions 
of grievance and memories of historical injustice form part of the existing ideological landscape 
that justifiers of atrocity seek to capitalize on and intensify. We have also observed some other 
historical factors that can make speech more dangerous, such as previous episodes of violence 
following similar inflammatory speech. Such episodes put both the speaker and the audience on 
notice that speech can indeed be catalytic of violence.
In some cases, language itself is an influential feature of relevant social and historical context. 
A single word can play this role, by taking on a fearsome meaning, as when verbs meaning “to 
eat” and “to wash” were used to refer to killing in the run-up to elections in June 2015 in Burundi. 
Such expressions were all the more powerful because the same words were used in the same ways 
during past killing in Burundi, and in neighboring Rwanda, before the 1994 genocide.54
The last contextual element is the means of dissemination of speech. Where a community or 
audience relies predominantly on one source of news or information, the fact that a message 
comes from that source may, itself, render the message more influential. This was the case for 
broadcasts over the notorious Rwandan radio station RTLM, according to witnesses who testified 
at the Rwanda war crimes tribunal. Similarly, the International Criminal Court chose to indict 
Genocide.” International Security Vol. 37, No. 2, 119-155; Suny, Ronald Grigory. 2004. Why We Hate You: The Passions of 
National Identity and Ethnic Violence, Berkeley Program in Societ and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series. Berkeley.
50 Benesch, Susan. 2008. “Vile Crime or Inalienable Right: Defining Incitement to Genocide,” Virginia Journal of International 
Law Vol 48, No 3, 458–528.
51 Urdal, Henrik. 2006. “A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence.” International Studies Quarterly Vol. 
50, No 3, 607-629.; Gerlach, Extremely Violent Societies, 286-287.
52 For just a sampling of this work, see: United Nations, United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the 
Responsibility to Protect. Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes; Straus, Scott. 2012b. “‘Destroy Them to Save Us’: 
Theories of Genocide and the Logics of Political Violence.” Terrorism and Political Violence Vol. 24, No. 4, 544-560; Waller, 
James. 2007. Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Harff, 
Barbara. 2003. “No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 
1955.” American Political Science Review Vol. 97, No. 1, 57-73; Krain, Matthew. 1997. “State-Sponsored Mass Murder: The 
Onset and Severity of Genocides and Politicides.” Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 41, No. 3, 331-360; Fein, Helen. 1990. 
Genocide: A Sociological Perspective. London: Sage Publications; Staub, The Roots of Evil; Kuper, Leo. 1983. Genocide: Its 
Political Use in the Twentieth Century. New Haven: Yale University Press.
53 Awori, Kagonya, Susan Benesch, and Angela Crandall. 2013. “Umati: Kenyan Online Discourse to Catalyze and Counter 
Violence.” Conference Paper at 12th International Conference on Social Implications of Computers in Developing Countries. Ocho 
Rios, Jamaica, 19-22 May.
54 Hatcher, Jessica and Desire Nimubona. 2015. “Words are weapons as Burundi heads to the polls.” IRIN, 25 June. 
Available from: http://www.irinnews.org/report/101677/words-are-weapons-as-burundi-heads-to-the-polls (accessed 18 
January 2016).
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Joshua arap Sang, a Kenyan radio presenter, for crimes against humanity on the theory that his 
broadcasts over the airwaves of the Kalenjin-language station KASS-FM were very powerful, given 
the great influence of that station among Kalenjins in Kenya’s Rift Valley where massacres occurred 
in early 2008. Perpetrators can easily become “epistemically dependent”—reliant on particular 
disseminators for their information, and thereby internalize even very radical notions where there 
is a practical monopoly on local public discourse.55 This allows disseminators to saturate a given 
context with atrocity-justifying ideas, allowing even fantastical and abhorrent notions to appear as 
‘common sense’, and something that ‘everybody says’.56
Social media are starting to play a significant role in dissemination of dangerous speech 
and ideology. Increasingly, certain websites and online platforms are dominant sources of 
information for some people, who can easily come to believe in dangerous ideological claims when 
disseminated on such platforms via particular, often extremist, online networks: ‘silos’ or ‘echo 
chambers.’57 Even the choice of language itself can be a critical form of dissemination: the same 
message communicated in the “mother tongue” of an ethnic group can have more force than if it 
were delivered in a language shared by other groups, since this reinforces the sense of solidarity 
within the group, and may encourage a feeling of impunity given the presumption that one will 
only be understood by co-linguals.58
Two important clarifications are in order. First, although one of us is a legal scholar, this 
analytical framework is not intended to list the elements of a crime. Instead it articulates salient 
dangers created by certain contextual features, as a tool for monitoring and preventing mass 
violence. We believe that criminal prosecution for speech cannot be relied upon, especially alone, 
for the prevention of atrocities. It may even backfire in some cases, by making a speaker and his or 
her speech better known and therefore more influential than they would have been, without legal 
intervention.
Second, speech may be ‘dangerous’ even when only some of the prongs of our contextual 
analysis are relevant. For example, in some cases a speech act is highly dangerous even though the 
speaker is not particularly influential; indeed the speaker is sometimes unknown to the audience, 
especially when messages are disseminated online. As an example, in some communities in 
Pakistan and Afghanistan, to accuse a group of people of burning or defacing the Quran is such a 
dangerous speech act that it can easily trigger mob violence, even if the source of the accusation is 
neither influential nor authoritative.59
Only two elements are indispensable: the content of the speech act itself must be dangerous (see 
below), and the audience must be susceptible to incitement. An earlier version of this framework 
was mistakenly construed by some as a set of necessary conditions.60 Certainly a very dangerous 
speech act is one in which all five prongs are maximized. A highly influential speaker would 
address a susceptible audience in highly inflammatory terms, in a volatile social and historical 
context, using a powerful means of dissemination. This would be prototypical dangerous speech, 
but it is far from the only form that it takes. Not only are the prongs not all necessary in every case, 
but even where they are all relevant, they weigh quite differently in proportion to one another. 
55 Baurmann, “Rational Fundamentalism?”
56 Fujii, “Transforming the Moral Landscape,” 103-105; Kaufman, “Symbolic Politics,” 75.
57 Thompson, Robin L. 2011. “Radicalization and the Use of Social Media.” Journal of Strategic Security Vol. 4, No. 4, 167-
190; Schissler, Matt. 2014. “Echo chambers in Myanmar: Social media and the ideological justifications for mass violence.” 
Conference Paper at Communal Conflict in Myanmar: Characteristics, Causes, Consequences, Yangon, Myanmar 17-18 March; 
Benesch, Susan, “Flower Speech: New Responses to Hatred Online.” In Internet Monitor 2014: Reflections on the Digital 
World: Platforms, Policy, Privacy and Public Discourse. Edited by Urs Gasser, Jonathan L. Zittrain, Robert Faris, and Rebekah 
Heacock Jones. Cambridge MA: The Berkman Institute for Internet & Society at Harvard University. See also: Pariser, Eli. 
2011. The Filter Bubble: What the Internet is Hiding from You. London: Penguin Books.
58 Author interviews (Benesch), Kenya, 2011 & 2012.
59 Rubin, Alissa J. 2015. “Flawed Justice After a Mob Killed an Afghan Woman.” The New York Times, 26 December 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/27/world/asia/flawed-justice-after-a-mob-killed-an-afghan-woman.html?_r=0 (accessed 
18 January 2016). See also: Kayani, Amir, “Ahmadi Place of Worship Set Ablaze in Jhelum, Riots Erupt after Blasphemy 
Allegations.” Dawn, 21 November 2015, http://www.dawn.com/news/1221273 (accessed 18 January 2016).
60 Marcus, Kenneth L. 2012. “Accusation in a Mirror.” Loyola University Chicago Law Journal Vol. 43, No. 2, 357-393.
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For example, where speech is produced by a very powerful or influential speaker, that speaker’s 
identity may weigh heavily, and the medium by which the speech was disseminated may not carry 
much weight. In another case, the opposite could be true.
 
Content
As noted in our introduction the claims and arguments used to justify mass atrocities—the actual 
content of dangerous speech and dangerous ideology—are (like dangerous contextual factors) so 
similar from case to case that they form characteristic patterns. Based on past work,61 we identify 
six justificatory mechanisms, of varying degrees of theoretical originality. Collectively, these 
provide a framework for thinking about the major recurring ways in which violence is made 
to look permissible, desirable and even necessary before, during, and after mass atrocities, and 
thus describe the content of dangerous speech that makes it likely to catalyze violence. These six 
mechanisms overlap heavily, so the borders between them are blurry, and individual speech acts 
tend to involve multiple mechanisms at once. Together, the six mechanisms provide a framework 
for more easily identifying dangerous speech and ideology in practice in monitoring and prevention 
efforts. 
1. Dehumanization
Targets of dangerous speech are described in a variety of ways that deny or diminish their 
humanity, reducing the moral significance of their future deaths, or the duties owed to 
them by potential perpetrators.62 Violence against victims has been variously justified by 
describing them as either biologically subhuman (“cockroaches”, “microbes”, “parasites”, 
“yellow ants”),63 mechanically inhuman (“logs”, “packages”, “enemy morale”),64 or 
supernaturally alien (“devils”, “Satan”, “demons”).65 Dehumanising discourses and 
conceptions have been identified in almost all major mass atrocities, prominently including 
those of Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia, Rwanda, Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Indonesia, and 
the Japanese occupation of China.66 Often, outgroup members (or victims-to-be) are even 
compared with toxins, microbes, or cancer, suggesting that they are polluting, despoiling, 
or debilitating the entire in-group—leading to particularly prominent recurring demands 
to ‘purify’ groups or societies from the supposedly toxifying elements.67 Multiple 
mechanisms explain this effect. Dehumanization can consciously defeat normative 
concerns about violence by allow perpetrators to believe that the targets of violence lack 
moral protections. Like guilt attribution and threat construction, dehumanization moves 
out-group members into a social category in which conventional moral restraints on 
how people can be treated do not seem to apply. They are now “outside the universe of 
[moral] obligation,” as Helen Fein has described it.68 But dehumanization can also work 
at a much less conscious level – perceptually eroding affective moral concern for certain 
61 Leader Maynard, “Rethinking the Role of Ideology”; Leader Maynard, “Combating Atrocity-Justifying Ideologies”; 
Kiernan, “Twentieth-Century Genocides”; Slim, Killing Civilians; Bellamy, Massacres and Morality.
62 Haslam, “Dehumanization.”
63 Sémelin, Purify and Destroy, 38 & 243; Weitz, Century of Genocide, 156.
64 Newman, Leonard S. 2002. “What is a ‘Social-Psychological’ Account of Perpetrator Behavior? The Person Versus the 
Situation in Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Willing Executioners.” In Understanding Genocide: The Social Psychology of the Holocaust. 
Edited by. Leonard S. Newman and Ralph Erber. New York: Oxford University Press, 64 fn.4; Weitz, Century of Genocide, 
222; Overy, Richard J. 2012. “‘The Weak Link’? The Perception of the German Working Class by RAF Bomber Command, 
1940-1945.” Labour History Review Vol. 77, No. 1, 11-33.
65 Chirot, Daniel and Clark McCauley. 2006. Why Not Kill Them All?: The Logic and Prevention of Mass Political Murder. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 80; Gerlach, Extremely Violent Societies, 44.
66 Mann, Dark Side of Democracy, 66, 74-75, 79, 85, 92, 172 & 322; Kiernan, “Twentieth-Century Genocides,” 32-33 & 45-51; 
Melson, Robert. 2003. “Modern Genocide in Rwanda: Ideology, Revolution, War and Mass Murder in an African State.” 
In The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective. Edited by Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 333; Sémelin, Purify and Destroy, 38-39, 243 & 253.
67 Sémelin, Purify and Destroy; Neilsen, Rhiannon S. 2015. “‘Toxification’ as a more precise early warning sign for genocide 
than dehumanization? An emerging research agenda.” Genocide Studies and Prevention Vol. 9, No. 1, 83-95.
68 Fein, Accounting for Genocide, 4-9.
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categories of person, and encouraging emotional responses of revulsion or antipathy. A 
series of influential psychological studies by Albert Bandura and colleagues thus highlight 
the power of dehumanization by finding that even single dehumanizing words heard 
casually can frame outgroup members in such a way so as to substantially increase levels 
of aggression and violence against them.69
2. Guilt Attribution 
Individuals, or an entire group, are said to be guilty of heinous past crimes against the 
in-group (or audience of the speaker) , which warrant a violent response. Violence is 
presented as just punishment (and perhaps vengeance)70 for their wrongdoing. Such claims 
of guilt are often at the core of anti-civilian ideologies, and elites go to extensive efforts 
to cement them in the minds of killers.71 In the ongoing Syrian civil war, for example, 
“security services and official media [have] spread blood-curdling, often exaggerated 
and sometimes wholly imaginary stories of the protesters’ alleged sectarian barbarism”.72 
Similarly, the Rwandan Hutu nationalist magazine Kangura stated: “The unspeakable 
crimes of the Inyenzi [‘cockroaches’, referring to Tutsi] of today… recall those of their 
elders: killing, pillaging, raping girls and women, etc.”73 Indeed, rumours or accusations of 
rape are particularly prominent—and play on sexual anxieties that fuel macho nationalism 
on the part of young male perpetrators.74
Critically, victims are often deemed guilty as a group, deserving collective punishment 
for the specific crimes of some of their “members”.75 Such processes expose the enormous 
atrocity-justifying potential of demonyms or group-labels, as predicted by prominent 
psychological research on social categorization.76 Once real or imagined crimes committed 
by specific, individual human beings are repeatedly discussed in terms of “Jews”, “Tutsis”, 
“Muslims”, “Japs” or similar pluralized identities, perpetrators prove remarkably 
willing to conceive of all members of the referenced category as equally and uniformly 
complicit.
3. Threat Construction 
A speaker asserts that the in-group faces serious and often mortal threats from the victims-
to-be, which makes violence seem defensive, and therefore proper and necessary. Tales 
of future wrongdoing (threat construction) can be even more powerful than tales of past 
crimes (guilt attribution), since the future is frightening. The significance of such processes 
is uncontroversial across research on genocide, mass atrocities, and armed conflict. What 
69 Bandura, Albert. 1999. “Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities.” Personality and Social Psychology 
Review Vol. 3, No. 3, 193-209; Bandura, Albert, Bill Underwood, and Michael E. Fromson. 1975. “Disinhibition of 
Aggression Though Diffusion of Responsibility and Dehumanization of Victims.” Journal of Research in Personality Vol. 9, 
No 4, 253-269.
70 See also: Balcells, Laia. 2010. “Rivalry and Revenge: Violence against Civilians in Conventional Civil Wars.” International 
Studies Quarterly Vol. 54, No 2. 291-313; Souleimanov, Emil Aslan and Huseyn Aliyev. 2015. “Blood Revenge and Violent 
Mobilization: Evidence from the Chechen Wars.” International Security Vol. 40, No. 2, 158-180.
71 Cohrs, “Ideological Bases of Violent Conflict,” 61-62 & 66.
72 International Crisis Group. 2011. “Uncharted Waters: Thinking Through Syria’s Dynamics.” Crisis Group Middle East 
Briefing No. 31, 2.
73 Midlarsky, Killing Trap, 177.
74 For the strong links between masculinity, sexuality, and nationalism, see: Nagel, Joane. 1998. “Masculinity and 
nationalism: gender and sexuality in the making of nations.” Ethnic and Racial Studies Vol. 21, No. 2; Wu, Guanjun. 2014. 
“Chinese Nationalism.” Conference Paper at Exploring Ideological Translations. University of Nottingham, Nottingham UK, 
10 July.
75 Mosse, George L. 1990. “Toward the Final Solution: A History of Racism.” In The History and Sociology of Genocide: 
Analyses and Case Studies. Edited by Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn. New Haven: Yale University Press, 357; Hinton, 
Alexander Laban. 2012a. “Introduction: Genocide and Anthropology.” In Genocide: An Anthropological Reader. Edited by 
Alexander Laban Hinton. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 11; Slim, Killing Civilians, 143-151.
76 Tajfel, Henri. 1974. “Social Identity and Intergroup Nehaviour.” Social Science Information Vol. 13, No. 2; Haslam, 
“Dehumanization,” 259 & 261-262; Slim, Killing Civilians, 175-176.
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is critical and not as familiar is that notions of threat are frequently a product of ideological 
construction.77
This justification is so powerful since it is the collective analogue of the only iron-clad 
defence to homicide in myriad systems of penal law and cultural norms: self-defence. 
Where dehumanization makes atrocities seem acceptable, threat construction takes the 
crucial next step of making them seem necessary. Whether through the passionate assertion 
of enemy machinations to destroy the in-group, or the more ambivalent circulation of 
rumours, anecdotal incidents, and vague accusations, perpetrators can successfully 
propagate beliefs that the threat is real. Such beliefs can sometimes capitalise on genuine 
threats or at least reasonable insecurities—they need not be complete madness. But they 
provide reasons to believe that certain groups need to be targeted with violence. As Martin 
Shaw explains, mass killings are thus accompanied by a “construction of civilian groups 
as enemies, not only in a social or political but also in a military sense, to be destroyed”, a 
process often conducted by key military, security and political authorities.78
In a strange yet common form of threat construction, a speaker accuses another group of 
planning to engage in the sort of violence that the speaker wants to see perpetrated against 
them, instead. This has been dubbed (originally in a Hutu propaganda manual discovered 
after the 1994 genocide) 79 “accusation in a mirror.” 80 Examples of the technique are legion. 
In the speech with which we opened this article, Arthur Seyss-Inquart accused Jews of 
planning to annihilate the German people—a baseless claim that in fact mirrored what 
the Nazis planned and would attempt to do to the Jews. The idea that Jews would wipe 
out the German volk—if Germans did not pre-empt that effort—was a relentless feature of 
Nazi propaganda, of which Seyss-Inquart’s speech was just a typical example. Speeches 
and articles by Hutu leaders before that genocide similarly warned that the Tutsi were 
planning to annihilate the Hutu. The same technique is also widely used in less famous 
cases of intergroup violence: examples found by Kenneth Marcus include the claim that 
Coptic Christians in Egypt were amassing weapons with which to attack the Muslim 
majority in that country.81
The degree of psychological projection involved can be remarkable—as a Viennese 
Austrian who participated in the slaughter of two thousand Jews in Mogilev in the Soviet 
Union wrote to his wife: “By the tenth car, I was aiming calmly and shooting dependably 
at the many women, children and babies. Bearing in mind that I have two babies at home, 
I knew they would suffer exactly the same treatment, if not ten times as bad, at the hands 
of these hordes.”82 As this quote illustrates, a strong degree of future-bias (see below) is 
also often present in threat-construction, with a rhetoric of absolute certainty in the future 
behaviour of others, perhaps in decades hence, key to the reasoning. 
Several justificatory mechanisms work together to confer force, or persuasiveness, on 
accusation in a mirror. It is a powerful form of threat construction, first of all. It also 
attributes guilt to the victims-to-be for the crimes that they are said to be planning. Finally, 
it destroys an audience’s perception that it has alternative courses of action, since a group 
convinced that it faces a mortal or existential threat can see no alternative other than to 
fend off that threat by any means available. It is in this sense that accusation in a mirror 
77 Shaw, Martin. 2007. What is Genocide?. Cambridge: Polity Press, 36, 41, 105, 114 & 131; Chirot and McCauley, Why Not 
Kill Them All?, 61; Cohrs, “Ideological Bases of Violent Conflict,” 66; Hinton, Alexander Laban, editor. 2002b. Genocide: An 
Anthropological Reader. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, Part III.
78 Shaw, What is Genocide?, 86 & 111.
79 Reported in Des Forges, Alison. 1999. “Leave none to tell the story”: genocide in Rwanda. New York: Human Rights Watch.
80 Kelman, Herbert C. 2007. “Social-Psychological Dimensions of International Conflict.” In Peacemaking in International 
Conflict: Methods and Techniques. Edited by I. William Zartman. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 84; 
Slim, Killing Civilians, 139; Malešević, Siniša. 2006. Identity as ideology: understanding ethnicity and nationalism. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 219 & 223-225.
81 Marcus, “Accusation in a Mirror.”
82 Goldhagen, Daniel. 2010. Worse Than War: Genocide, Eliminationism and the Ongoing Assault on Humanity. London: 
Abacus, 337.
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is a collective analogue of the doctrine of self-defence as a near-universal moral and legal 
justification for killing.
4. The Destruction of Alternatives
Violence is presented as inevitable, as necessitated by forces beyond the control of human 
agency, or as the only choice open to perpetrators. Decision-making always occurs within 
a delimited field of possibilities: human beings do not consciously consider every one 
of the infinite options in any situation, but focus decision making on those choices that 
appear salient.83 This ‘menu’ of alternatives can be significantly expanded or contracted 
by ideology and speech. Eliminating the perceived viability of alternatives to violence 
is therefore just as critical as are assertions of the desirability or permissibility of violent 
options themselves. There are various ways in which this destruction of alternatives84 can 
occur. It its most grandiose form, violence might be presented as a historical necessity, as 
an ineradicable feature of ‘racial struggle’, ‘class conflict’, ‘human progress’, ‘the nature 
of war’ and so forth. The Holocaust, Communist mass killings, and colonial genocides 
against native peoples, were all prominently justified by their perpetrators as simply 
mandated by iron laws of nature and historical change. Genocide thus became seen, in the 
words of one American perpetrator of genocidal policies against the Native Americans, 
“as ultimately beneficial as it was inevitable”.85 Hitler asked his dinner guests: “In any 
case, is it we who created nature, established its laws? Things are as they are, and we 
can do nothing to change them”.86 And citizens of the Soviet Union later testified that 
they thought the violence of the Stalinist era was simply the only possible and thus 
necessary path to Communism: “I had my doubts about the Five Year Plan... But I justified 
it by the conviction that we were building something great...a new society that could 
not have been built by voluntary means”.87 But often the destruction of alternatives is 
more contingent that this: alternatives might be destroyed by normatively disparaging 
them and associating them with reprehensible moral qualities (see ‘Virtuetalk’ below); or 
they might be presented as inefficacious or impractical, often as a matter of assertion or 
taken-for-granted self-evidence; or they may be framed as unacceptable given particular 
situations – ‘supreme emergencies’ or ‘states of exception’88—so that mass atrocities 
seem the only possible course. Frequently, violence is imputed as inevitable in ‘war’ or 
international anarchy, and thus pointless to criticize. Enthusiastically championing mass 
aerial bombardment of German civilians in World War II, British newspapers proclaimed 
to their readers that: “This is the only policy. This is the only effective method available 
to us in self-defence… The invention of the bombing plane abolished chivalry for ever. 
It is now ‘retaliate or go under’. We are not dedicated to passive and polite martyrdom. 
We must hit back…”89 Irrespective of the method, the destruction of alternatives serves to 
‘deagentify’ the violence: making it appear to be the product of irresistible inhuman forces 
rather than conscious choices by policymakers and perpetrators, and thereby promoting 
moral disengagement from their acts.90 This can occur at a more macro or micro level. With 
macro-level destruction of alternatives, individual perpetrators might accept that they 
faced a choice to participate in the violence as an individual, but the violence itself takes on 
83 Foucault, “The Subject and Power.”
84 We borrow the phrase from Gordy, Eric. 1999. The Culture of Power in Serbia: Nationalism and the Destruction of 
Alternatives. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
85 Gellately, Robert and Ben Kiernan. 2003. “Investigating Genocide.” In The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical 
Perspective. Edited by Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 24.
86 Trevor-Roper, Hugh. 1953. Hitler’s Table Talk. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 134.
87 Figes, Orlando. 2002. The Whisperers: Private Life in Stalin’s Russia. London: Penguin Books, 111.
88 Agamben, Georgio. 2005. State of Exception trans. Kevin Attell. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
89 Connelly, Mark, 2002. “The British People, the Press and the Strategic Air Campaign against Germany, 1939-45.” 
Contemporary British History Vol. 16, No. 2, 47-48.
90 Bandura, “Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities.”
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the appearance of a simple dictate of the situation or of natural laws, rather than a chosen 
policy selected by the perpetrators.91 Often, of course, the destruction of alternatives occurs 
at the micro level too—many perpetrators affirm that they personally had no choice, 
perhaps due to coercion or due to sincere beliefs in specific situational pressures.92 This is 
more likely to be rooted in individual conceptions than in speech and ideology, but these 
could play a role—situational pressures do not speak for themselves but are interpreted in 
light of how they are framed in speech and perceived in light of ideological assumptions.93 
Speech that inculcates fears about punishment for non-conformity to violent campaigns, 
that frames individual choice as absent, or that spreads intense peer-pressure and notions 
of required behaviour can be crucial to the destruction of alternatives at the individual 
level.
5. Virtuetalk
 The valorization of violence by associating it with a range of praiseworthy characteristics, 
and the parallel denigration of resistance or non-participation as indicating a lack of 
proper character traits, a deplorable “weakness”, or a range of other deficiencies. As a 
now substantial literature in psychology emphasizes, most ordinary political and ethical 
thinking is not intellectualized philosophy, but is guided by vague but quick and often 
deeply felt impressions and intuitions regarding what “looks” or “feels” good or bad.94 
Researchers have also long recognized that human beings are powerfully motivated to 
draw a satisfactory mental image of themselves, a positive moral self-identity, often shaped 
by notions of ideal group-identities, that produces considerable self-esteem.95 Virtuetalk 
capitalizes on these psychological tendencies, directing and regulating individuals’ moral 
emotions, by reconstructing violence as admirable. Violence is linked through verbal 
expressions, symbolism and imagery to a range of praiseworthy qualities: duty, honour, 
courage, toughness, manliness, and so forth. Not to participate in violence is to expose 
oneself to internal shame or social ridicule as an improper or inadequate member of the 
in-group, or (often) not a proper or adequate man—since virtuetalk tends to be heavily 
gendered, targeting the insecurities prominent amongst the young men who might join 
the ranks of perpetrators.96 Typically the virtues chosen represent established social 
values, that carry considerable existing cultural status. Sometimes, though, virtuetalk 
may involve an explicit harshening of the dominant ideological discourse of virtue—a 
‘revalencing’ of qualities like mercilessness, brutality, and ruthlessness as positive traits. 
In Nazi Germany, one SS general declared that “every man should be trained to be a 
fanatical hater”97 and a Nazi police battalion instruction manual likewise stated that “he 
behaves correctly who, by setting aside all possible impulses of personal feeling, proceeds 
ruthlessly and mercilessly”.98 The Hutu Ten Commandments, disseminated in the Kangura 
newspaper in Rwanda in December 1990, likewise demanded that Hutu “stop having 
mercy on the Batutsi”,99 whilst a Radio Rwanda broadcast a month earlier stated that “since 
their goal is to exterminate and enslave us, we must not feel any mercy to them”.100 The 
91 Arendt, Hannah. 1976. The Origins of Totalitarianism. Orlando: Harcourt Books, 349 & 465.
92 Fujii, Killing Neighbours, Ch. 6.
93 Newman, “A ‘Social-Psychological’ Account,” 60-62.
94 Slovic et al., “Psychic Numbing,” 127; Haidt, Jonathan. 2012. The Righteous Mind. London: Allen Lane; Haidt, Jonathan, 
Jesse Graham, and Craig Joseph. 2009. “Above and Below Left-right: Ideological Narratives and Moral Foundations.” 
Psychological Inquiry Vol. 20, No. 2-3, 110-119.
95 Tajfel, “Social identity,” 67-72.
96 Hinton, “Why Did They Kill?,” 95; Hoess, Rudolf. 1959. Commandant of Auschwitz. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 82.; 
Browning, Ordinary Men, 66, 72 & 129-30.
97 Mann, Dark Side of Democracy, 200.
98 Browning, Ordinary Men, 183.
99 Fujii, “Transforming the Moral Landscape,” 102.
100 Ibid, 104.
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Khmer Rouge similarly applauded “seething hatred and blood rancour against national 
and class enemies”.101 And in parallel to such praise, virtuetalk presents the failure to 
engage in violence as shameful—an indicator of treason, dishonour or weakness—so that 
in the words of one former Bolshevik: “I would still my doubts the way I had learned to... 
the concepts of conscience, honour, humaneness we dismissed as idealistic prejudices, 
‘intellectual’ or ‘bourgeois’ and, hence, perverse.”102 Virtuetalk is crucial for explaining 
how perpetrators come to see violence as permissible and even desirable, and has not 
received sufficient analysis in scholarship thus far.103
6. Future-Bias
 The confident anticipation of future goods that will be accrued through violence, and 
which are so extensive and so enduring in a relatively certain future that they easily 
outweigh the moral costs of victims’ deaths in the here and now. Violence is rarely 
justified without any reference to its consequences,104 many of which are implicit in 
the other justificatory mechanisms (it is assumed that good consequences will flow 
from the elimination of threats or the punishment of guilty parties). The future goods 
can thus be fairly basic—ensuring that no out-group dare threaten the in-group again, 
promising that military victory in a campaign will be achieved through extreme violence, 
or anticipating economic or scientific benefits from atrocities. Himmler justified Nazi 
massacres of Russian prisoners of war and civilians with the claim that: “Communism is 
a tremendous danger for the future. We must get away from the standpoint of soldierly 
comradeship. The Communist is from first to last no comrade. It is a war of extermination. 
If we do not regard it as such, we may defeat the enemy, but in thirty years’ time we 
will again be confronted by the Communist enemy.”105 One German doctor, in a research 
plan for experiments on handicapped children in the spring of 1942, was confident that 
these acts would produce results: “…reaching far beyond other scientific discussion and 
research in the field of psychiatry, at last the most practical and immediate questions 
affecting the health of the nation can be most comprehensively resolved because thanks 
to the [euthanasia] programme a rapid anatomical and histological clarification can be 
achieved.”106 But the anticipated benefits can also be extravagant and utopian—promises 
that a positive transformation of society will be brought about through a temporary 
violent transition, or that national unity and prosperity for a long-mistreated people can be 
obtained. In light of the expectation that Soviet violence would protect the revolution and 
usher in Communist utopia, Lenin assured his followers that in the future “the cruelty of 
our lives, imposed by circumstance, will be understood and pardoned. Everything will be 
understood, everything.”107 Soviet ideology and the justification of massive violence and 
cruelty in the name of a promised future society of abundance convinced millions in the 
Stalinist era. The novelist Boris Pasternak wrote in a letter in 1935: “The fact is, the longer I 
live the more firmly I believe in what is being done, despite everything. Much of it strikes 
one as being savage [yet] the people have never before looked so far ahead, and with such 
a sense of self-esteem, and with such fine motives, and for such vital and clear-headed 
101 Weitz, Century of Genocide, 153.
102 Kopelev, Lev. 1977. No Jail for Thought, trans. Anthony Austin. London: Secker & Warburg, 32-34.
103 There are a few significant exceptions: Frazer and Hutchings, “Argument and Rhetoric”; Frazer, Elizabeth and 
Kimberly Hutchings. 2011. “Virtuous Violence and the Politics of Statecraft in Machiavelli, Clausewitz and Weber.” 
Political Studies Vol. 59, No. 1, 56-73; Der Derian, James. 2009. Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial Media-
Entertainment Network, 2nd ed. New York: Routledge; Fiske, Alan and Tage Shakti Rai. 2014. Virtuous Violence: Hurting and 
Killing to Create, Sustain, End, and Honor Social Relationships. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
104 O’Boyle, Garrett. 2002. “Theories of Justification and Political Violence: Examples from Four Groups.” Terrorism and 
Political Violence Vol. 14, No. 2, 23-46.
105 Burleigh, Third Reich, 518.
106 Noakes, Jeremy and Geoffrey Pridham. 1988. Nazism 1919-1945: A Documentary Reader, 1st ed., 3 vols., vol. 3. Exeter: 
University of Exeter Press, 1009, Doc. 728.
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reasons.”108 Many individuals can be persuaded that even seriously harmful moral acts 
can be justified in certain circumstances if a significant enough need or benefit flows from 
them.109 Dangerous speech can lead perpetrators to become convinced that they “know” 
that their actions serve certain ends, or produce certain benefits, often simply because 
their actions have been defined as aiming at those ends. Often, though, there are deeper 
foundations for confidence, with expectations for the positive future rooted in underlying 
ideologies: the assuredly improved future of a racially pure nation, a theologically-correct 
caliphate, a ‘final solution’ to a correctly diagnosed security threat, and so forth. Either 
way, the actual uncertainty (or even complete fantasy) of promised future goods is not 
factored into the consequentialist calculations, and the real and established suffering of 
victims in the here and now is measured up on an equal basis (or worse) with anticipated 
and far from certain future benefits.
This integrated model of the contextual and content-based factors can form the foundation for 
more sophisticated monitoring of dangerous speech and dangerous ideology, and thereby support 
efforts to assess the risks of genocide and other mass atrocities. Data collection can be difficult 
but is not an insuperable challenge. The uploading of videos of dangerous speech by supporters 
or witnesses online, the migration of dangerous speech and ideology itself online, especially 
into social media networks, and the typical need for perpetrators to engage in widespread 
dissemination of their ideological speech via print, video and radio media means that dangerous 
speech and ideology are more easily documented than ever before. In addition, the increasing 
deployment of crowd-sourcing technology and partially-automated online monitoring is opening 
up new methods for data-collection.110 What is needed, though, is an analytical framework that 
can permit consistent, structured and theoretically informed examination of the data. Already, an 
earlier version of Benesch’s Dangerous Speech framework was used to support the Umati project, 
monitoring dangerous speech in Kenya before and after the 2013 national elections there.111 This 
new integrated model now offers the sort of framework that we believe can significantly advance 
the sophistication and accuracy of monitoring.
Countering Dangerous Speech and Ideology
This framework can also support prevention efforts, since efforts to counter dangerous speech and 
ideology will be more effective when they are based on a detailed understanding of when they are 
dangerous, and why.112 This is difficult, of course, and in many cases it is impossible for outside 
actors to do it successfully.113 There are no easy options in genocide and atrocity prevention, 
however, and efforts to monitor and counter dangerous speech and ideology are not especially 
costly or risky when compared with other means such as military operations, targeted sanctions, 
legal indictments, or on-the-ground fact-finding missions.114 Moreover, prevention efforts are not 
an all or nothing endeavour—and even if interventions targeting speech and ideology do not 
prevent genocides or mass atrocities outright, they may reduce participation rates and thus save 
lives.
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Efforts to counter dangerous speech and dangerous ideology, like other preventive effects, can 
be conducted at either the long-term ‘systemic’ level, aiming to strengthen obstacles to violence in 
contexts with a general risk of mass violence, or through more short-term targeted interventions, 
in response to escalating risks of immediate outbreaks of atrocities.115 Existing work in the former 
category includes the programs of Radio La Benevolencija in West and Central Africa to inoculate 
audiences against inflammatory and hateful speech, and the reconciliation and peace-building 
projects of organizations like Search for Common Ground and Fondation Hirondelle. Past efforts 
in the latter category include the extensive saturation of Kenyan society with pro-peace messages in 
anticipation of the 2013 elections.116 In Kenya, for example, the cast of the popular television drama 
Vioja Mahakamani produced four episodes in 2012 on dangerous speech, designed to inoculate 
audiences against such speech. They were independently evaluated by scholars at the University 
of Pennsylvania’s Annenberg School of Communications, who found that Kenyans who watched 
the episodes were more sceptical about inflammatory speech than those who had not watched 
the episodes.117 And as noted earlier, a parallel campaign in Nigeria analyzed by Paul Collier and 
Pedro Vicente appeared to substantially reduce levels of actual violence in the 2007 elections.118
Our model can support identification of the sorts of speech and ideology that ought to be 
countered, and the ideas and interventions that might stand a chance of succeeding at this. Scholars 
have already suggested appeals or norms that might obstruct the ideas and discourses that serve 
to justify mass atrocities: stressing, for example “humanism”, “non-divisionism”, “humanization”, 
and “universalism”.119 We support these suggestions, but our integrated model highlights how 
such ideas would target only a limited part of the justificatory practices that can make atrocities look 
permissible or desirable. One can promote humanistic norms and the perception of universal rights 
successfully, for example, but if a society is still permeated by perceptions of violence as admirable and 
virtuous and a compelling narrative of threat-construction asserting the existence of hidden enemies 
within, atrocities will remain more than a theoretical possibility.120 Humanism, nondivisionism, 
humanization and universalism frustrate some avenues through which mass atrocities can be 
justified, but leave others open. As well as highlighting this problem, our integrated model can 
help address it, and facilitate a more comprehensive strategy. Efforts to counter dangerous speech 
and ideology need to encourage scepticism that certain people are subhuman, collectively guilty, 
or pose an existential threat. In addition, they should cultivate antipathy towards violent virtuetalk, 
facilitate awareness of alternatives to violence, and encourage doubts over claims that violence 
will bring great benefits. To accomplish this, they should train political and civil society actors to 
identify and counter the hallmarks of dangerous speech and ideology that we identify here.
And prevention efforts are not simply a matter of countering the recurring content of 
justifications of violence, but also, as our model highlights, about eroding the contexts within which 
such justifications can be powerful. Long-term systemic efforts must address entrenched ideological 
components of the socio-historical context on which justifications capitalize, and push for diversity in 
the networks of information and news, to undermine epistemic dependence by audiences on unreliable 
or even malevolent sources of discourse. Short-term targeted efforts should seek to undermine the 
authority and credibility of those disseminating dangerous ideology, contest audience sympathies, 
and seek to sway reluctant perpetrators, especially those at the elite level who could potentially 
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be lobbied into resisting rather than supporting policies that lead to genocide or mass atrocities. At 
both the systemic and targeted level, online communities of influential actors committed to peace 
should be mobilized to counter ideas conducive to the justification of mass atrocities.
What clearly emerges from the complexity of the contextual and content-based components 
of dangerous speech and ideology is that preventive efforts of a long-term systemic or short-term 
targeted nature require sophisticated planning, strategizing and campaigning. The contextual 
rootedness of many ideas and appeals means that effective interventions cannot be conducted by 
external actors. Local expertise, credibility, and persuasive capacity is crucial.
Conclusion
Efforts to monitor and counter dangerous speech and dangerous ideology remain at a very early 
stage of theory and practice. In this paper, we have advanced an integrated model of the contextual 
and content-based risk factors that define dangerous speech and dangerous ideology: those 
communicative acts, and the sets of ideas they reflect and disseminate, that make genocide and 
other mass atrocities seem permissible and even necessary. This is only a first step in formulating 
more sophisticated monitoring and preventive strategies. But it is a vital one, if such strategies are 
going to be built on a more holistic appreciation of the role played by speech and ideology, and 
work to monitor and counter the full panoply, and not merely a narrow subset, of the words and 
ideas that encourage the worst of humanity’s crimes.
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